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Abstract 
 
The time-limited dispatch (TLD) of aircraft allows operators to efficiently meet 
certification requirements. In order to display that these requirements are met it is 
necessary to model the aircraft systems to which TLD is being applied. Currently 
variations of fault tree analysis and Markov analysis are commonly used. However, in 
order to apply either of these methods a number of assumptions are made in order to 
assist in the analysis. Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) is presented here as an 
alternative method of demonstrating the required level of system reliability. A simple 
system is analysed using a time-weighted average approach, a reduced fault state 
Markov approach and a MCS approach. MCS is seen to offer benefits when 
modelling the application of TLD to a simple system that could also be seen in the 
modelling of the application of TLD to real aircraft systems.  
 
Introduction 
 
Time-limited dispatch (TLD) was first utilised after the introduction of Full Authority 
Digital Electronic Control (FADEC) systems to commercial aircraft about 20 years 
ago.  These electronic engine control systems regulate engine thrust from the 
beginning of fuel metering up to the time of fuel shutoff.  When FADEC systems 
were introduced it was to be the first time that a hydromechanical control (HMC) 
system would be unavailable to pilots in the event of an electronic system failure [1]. 
 
FADEC systems are designed around a dual channel control system, and as such 
incorporate a degree of redundancy.  Each engine has a FADEC system in which all 
critical loops and functions have either dual systems or redundant elements.  Although 
it was expected that this would lead to greater control system integrity, the dispatch 
criteria imposed when FADECs were introduced actually led to an increase in delays 
and cancellations of flights [2], [3].  This was due to the fact that, in the absence of 
any dispatch guidelines for FADEC systems, a conservative approach was taken in 
which dispatch was forbidden with faults in more than one channel of an engine.  
However, because of the high reliability of the FADEC systems in comparison to the 
HMC systems, an opportunity arose to utilise the redundancy present to allow 
dispatch with faults present in the FADECs.  Required airworthiness standards would 
still be met and aircraft operators would benefit from the reduction in delays and 
cancellations of flights.  The new approach, which allowed dispatch with reduced 
levels of redundancy, was called time-limited dispatch (TLD). 
 
TLD allows the dispatch of aircraft with faults present whilst assuring a level of 
system reliability.  This level was set according to the levels that were required of the 
HMC systems that were used prior to the introduction of FADECs.  A maximum limit 
of 10 events per 106 flight hours (flt. hrs.) is set for the average loss of thrust control 
(LOTC) rate of the system [2].  In achieving this average a further restriction of an 
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upper limit of 100 events per 106 flt. hrs. is applied for the instantaneous LOTC rate 
of dispatchable system configurations.   
 
When implementing TLD an aircraft may be dispatched over differing periods of time 
according to the significance of the faults present in the system [2].  These dispatch 
intervals, which give the maximum time allowed for dispatch before the faults must 
be addressed, fall into four categories, these being: 
• Do Not Dispatch (DND), 
• Short Time Dispatch (STD), 
• Long Time Dispatch (LTD), 
• Manufacturer/Operator Defined Dispatch (MDD). 
The DND category, when applied, means the faults present in the system prohibit 
dispatch of the aircraft and the faults must be addressed immediately.  The STD 
category allows operation of the aircraft in the short term before corrective 
maintenance must be undertaken and the LTD category allows dispatch in the longer 
term.  The final category, MDD, is reserved for faults that do not affect the LOTC rate 
of the system [2].  The LOTC rate for faults in the LTD category must not exceed 75 
events per 106 flt. hrs.  STD category faults have a LOTC rate that lies between 75 
and 100 events per 106 flt. hrs. and for DND category faults the instantaneous LOTC 
rate exceeds 100 events per 106 flt. hrs. 
 
Maintenance Strategies 
 
Two maintenance strategies exist that may be used to maintain a system on which 
TLD is being implemented.  There is no restriction to which strategy must be used 
when maintaining a system.  In fact, if desired, one of the strategies may be used to 
maintain STD category faults while the other is used to maintain LTD category faults. 
The two maintenance approaches are described below. 
 
 
MEL Maintenance:  Minimum equipment list (MEL) maintenance [2] is generally 
applied to STD faults.  When MEL maintenance is used the exact time of occurrence 
of the fault must be known, at which time a ‘countdown’ is started of the appropriate 
dispatch interval. When the countdown ends the fault must be repaired in order to 
allow further dispatch of the aircraft.  This process is illustrated in Figure 1, where a 
fault occurring at time t1 initiates a dispatch interval ending at t2. If the fault is not 
repaired at or before t2 further dispatch of the aircraft is prohibited at that time. 
 
PIR Maintenance:  The second method of maintenance is periodic inspection/repair 
(PIR) maintenance, normally used with LTD category faults. This involves checking 
the system for faults at regular intervals. In this case the exact time of occurrence of 
the fault will not be known. If a fault is discovered at an inspection it is assumed to 
have occurred at the midpoint of consecutive inspections [2]. The dispatch interval is 
then deemed to have begun at the midpoint of the inspections and the allowed period 
dispatch interval 
t t1 t2 
Figure 1.  MEL Maintenance. 
 
dispatch interval 
t t1 t2 I2 I1 
T 
tf 
Figure 2.  PIR Maintenance. 
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of dispatch from the inspection where the fault was discovered is calculated. A PIR 
maintenance scenario is illustrated in Figure 2, in which I1 and I2 represent 
consecutive inspections of the system for faults. A fault, which occurred at time tf is 
discovered at I2 and, because the exact time of the fault is not known, is assumed to 
occur at t1, the midpoint of the inspection interval. The countdown of the dispatch 
interval is then assumed to have begun at this time and it will end at t2. This allows 
dispatch of the aircraft for a further time T after I2. The inspection interval for a fault 
category must not exceed twice the dispatch interval for faults of that category. In that 
way the average exposure to faults cannot exceed the appropriate dispatch interval. 
However, note that the maximum possible exposure of the system to a fault could be 
twice the dispatch interval. Contrast this with the MEL maintenance approach where 
the maximum possible exposure of the system to a fault is equal to the dispatch 
interval. 
 
PIR could be used to address the maintenance requirements of more than one category 
of faults. In systems where this is the case inspections for faults of a certain category 
may uncover faults that fall into another dispatch category. If this occurs the fault may 
be dealt with as if discovered at the next inspection for its own category [2]. For 
example, the presence of a STD fault at a LTD inspection would be noted but the 
STD fault would be treated as if found at the next inspection for STD faults. 
 
The Simultaneous Presence of Multiple Faults in the System 
 
Despite the high reliability of FADEC system components there exists the opportunity 
for more than one fault to be present in the system at any one time. If this happens 
there are a number of different issues that could arise and impact upon the 
maintenance of the FADEC system. Examples of such scenarios are outlined below 
for the MEL maintenance strategy. These examples are by no means exhaustive, but 
merely hint at the complexities involved in modelling the TLD process. Indeed, when 
one begins to consider PIR maintenance or a combination of MEL and PIR and, 
although such situations would be rare, the presence of more than two faults, the 
maintenance options available become more complex. 
 
 
Consider Figure 3, which depicts the occurrence of two faults, A and B, repaired using 
MEL maintenance. The dispatch intervals for these faults will end at t1 and t2 
respectively. As t1 is reached a number of options are possible. Clearly, fault A must 
be cleared from the system at this time in order to allow further dispatch. In addition 
to this either: 
• B may be allowed to remain in the system, allowing dispatch until t2, or 
• B may also be cleared from the system, allowing unlimited dispatch after t1. 
t A
 
t1 B t2 
 
Figure 3. Multiple Faults (MEL 
Maintenance). 
 
t A
 
t1 B t2 t3 
STD 
LTD 
LTD 
 
Figure 4.  The Combination of Multiple 
Faults (MEL Maintenance). 
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Figure 4 depicts a similar scenario to that shown in Figure 3. Faults A and B, when 
occurring in isolation, cause the initiation of LTD intervals, ending at t1 and t2 
respectively. However, as soon as both A and B are present within the system, the 
allowable period of dispatch is reduced to the STD category. This means that, as fault 
B occurs the system may then be dispatched only until time t3, not t2 as would be the 
case if fault A had not occurred. Upon reaching t3 there are three possible maintenance 
strategies: 
• Both faults, A and B, may be cleared from the system, allowing unlimited dispatch 
of the system, 
• Fault B alone may be cleared from the system, allowing dispatch until t1, at which 
point fault A must be addressed, or 
• Fault A alone may be cleared from the system, allowing dispatch until t2, at which 
point fault B must be addressed. 
Of course, this scenario assumes that t3 occurs before t1. If fault B occurred at such a 
time that t3 occurred after t1 then fault A would have to be cleared from the system at 
t1 before the STD maintenance deadline was reached at t3. 
 
When faults combine in the way just described to reduce the dispatch interval, the 
order of occurrence of the faults may have an effect on whether the dispatch interval 
is reduced or not. For instance, in the example shown in Figure 4, if fault B follows 
fault A a STD interval is initiated. If the ordering of these faults was unimportant the 
same reduction in dispatch interval would be seen if fault A followed fault B. 
However, if the ordering of these faults was important it may be that A following B 
would not lead to the same reduction in dispatch interval as when B followed A. 
 
The scenarios described above merely hint at the complexities of TLD and the repair 
processes involved in the maintenance of a FADEC system. When analysing the use 
of TLD in the maintenance of a FADEC system the ability of the model used to deal 
with these complexities may be of importance if accurate results are to be obtained. 
 
Modelling TLD 
 
Before applying TLD to a FADEC system it is important to be sure that the system 
will still meet the levels of safety required of it. To do this a mathematical model of 
the system is constructed and an analysis is performed to monitor the effects of TLD 
on the system and obtain the average LOTC rate of the system. Two methods of 
analysis that are widely used are described in [1] and [3]. These approaches are based 
on Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Markov Analysis and are briefly described below. 
Also described is a third technique, Monte Carlo simulation (MCS), proposed by the 
authors as a suitable alternative method of conducting a TLD analysis. 
 
Time-Weighted Average (TWA) Approach 
 
This TLD modelling approach obtains a value for the LOTC rate of the system by 
adding the following three quantities: 
1. The sum of the failure rates of faults in the mechanical/ hydromechanical 
portion of the FADEC system. 
2. The sum of the failure rates of the system due to unrevealed electrical/ 
electronic faults. 
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3. A time-weighted average (TWA) of the failure rates of the system from each 
of its dispatchable configurations. 
This last quantity is obtained by multiplying the fraction of time spent in each 
dispatchable system configuration by the failure rate to LOTC from that particular 
configuration. Consider a FADEC system with n dispatchable configurations and let 
the first of these (configuration 1) represent the full-up system state, the 
configurations numbered from 2 to m represent the configurations allowing STD and 
the configurations from m + 1 to n represent the configurations allowing LTD. Let λi 
represent the failure rate into the ith dispatchable configuration. Define Ti, the dispatch 
interval for the ith dispatchable system configuration as follows: 
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where TSTD is the short time dispatch interval and TLTD is the long time dispatch 
interval. Thus an expression for the TWA LOTC rate of the system is: 
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where λHMC represents the sum of failure rates due to mechanical/ hydromechanical 
faults and λUR represents the sum of failure rates due to unrevealed electrical/ 
electronic faults. ti is the fraction of time spent dispatching from dispatchable 
configuration i and λi,L represents the system failure rate to LOTC from the ith 
dispatchable configuration. Equation (2) is a general form of the equations given in 
[1], [3] and [4]. Because ti represents the fraction of time dispatching from system 
state i we require that the total of all n of these fractions is unity. Thus we obtain the 
following expression for t1, the fraction of time spent dispatching from the full-up 
state: 
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An approximation for ti with i = 2,…,n, i.e. the fraction of time spent dispatching 
from the faulty dispatchable configurations, is: 
 
.iii Tt λ=  (4) 
 
This is equivalent to the approximation given in the original version of SAE 
ARP5107 [3]. 
 
The system failure rate to LOTC from the ith dispatchable system configuration, λi,L, 
is calculated in [1] by dividing the failure probability to LOTC by the average flight 
time. This “probability per flight hour” is equated to the desired failure rate. Thus 
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where Qi,L is the failure probability of LOTC from the ith dispatchable configuration. 
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Thus, by substituting (3), (4) and (5) into (2), an expression for the TWA LOTC rate 
of the system may be obtained. 
 
In a revision to the original SAE ARP5107 document a revised method of calculating 
the time fractions ti, i = 2,…,n is given [4]. This method is claimed to better balance 
the fractions of time spent in each dispatchable system configuration because, rather 
than assuming the system is in the full-up state for all the time, it is assumed to be in 
the full-up state for t1. The new values for ti are: 
 
( ),1 iii Ttt λ=  (6) 
 
In this case (3) and (6) give a system of n linear simultaneous equations which can be 
solved for ti, i = 1,…,n. Then, together with (5) these may be substituted to give an 
expression for the TWA LOTC rate of the system. 
 
Reduced-State Markov Model Approach 
 
The reduced fault state Markov approach is similar to a conventional Markov 
modelling approach. However, there are two notable differences, these being: 
1. The number of system states is greatly reduced. 
2. An artificial simulated repair transition is added to the model. 
The reduced-state Markov approaches described in [1], [3] and [4] are similar in that 
the number of system states is reduced by considering usually only single fault states, 
i.e. states where only one fault exists in the system in addition to the full-up state and 
the LOTC state. Dual and higher order fault states may be added to the model if 
considered of particular importance or if the FADEC system architecture requires it. 
A reduced-state Markov model for a general system is shown in Figure 5. This 
particular model is similar to that given in SAE ARP5107 revision 1 [4]. As a single 
mechanical/ hydromechanical fault could cause LOTC from any fault state a 
transition is added from the full-up (state 1) and all single fault states (states 2,…,n) to 
Figure 5. A Single Fault State Markov Model. 
 
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the LOTC state. The other addition to the model, over a conventional model, is the 
feedback loop, a simulated repair from the LOTC state to the full-up state. This is 
added to the model in order to allow a steady state solution to be calculated. 
Considering the Markov model shown in Figure 5 the transition rate matrix, A, is 
given by: 
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All terms that are off-diagonal and are not elements of the first or last columns are 
zero. The term λH represents the sum of λHMC and λUR. This leads to a system of n+1 
differential equations, given by: 
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where 
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and Qi(t) is the probability of the system being in state i at time t. At steady state the 
rate of change of each of these probabilities is zero, therefore equation (8) becomes: 
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which is a system of n+1 linear simultaneous equations. These equations are 
dependent and in order to obtain an independent system one of the equations is 
arbitrarily chosen to be replaced by the constraint equation: 
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In order to find the LOTC rate of the system the average failure rate into the LOTC 
state, n+1, is used. The definition of the reduced-state Markov (RSM) LOTC rate is 
hence: 
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Equations 2 through to n of the set of simultaneous equations obtained above (from 
columns 2 to n of matrix A) yield the following expressions for Qi: 
 
,,,2,1
,
niQ
λλν
λQ
HLii
i
i K=
++
=  (14) 
 
which may be substituted into (13), along with a rearrangement of (11), to give: 
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where λi,LH is the sum of λi,L and λH. This is the general form of the solution for the 
reduced-state Markov model as given in [4]. If the repair intervals are as defined in 
equation (1) then the repair intervals are given as the reciprocals of the dispatch 
intervals, i.e. 
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Equations (15) and (16) may now be used to obtain the LOTC rate using different 
values of STD and LTD intervals. 
 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
The first step in performing a Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) is to create a computer 
code that will model the behaviour of the system over time. The code contains a 
structured, logical set of rules that will describe how the system reacts to every event 
that may occur during its use [5]. When modelling TLD such events could be 
component repairs, failures, sequences of failures or TLD maintenance deadlines and 
the like. The generation of a uniform set of random numbers is key to the success of 
any MCS. In a TLD simulation these random numbers are used to generate 
component failure times using the relevant failure or repair distributions for each 
component. The simulations are run until such a time that the system fails or the 
maximum lifetime of the system is reached. After each simulation the relevant 
parameters are stored and once these parameters lie within the required tolerance the 
series of simulations is ended. 
 
When TLD is modelled using MCS the scheduling of events that affect the system is 
of the utmost importance. Component failure times are initially added to the schedule. 
The simulation time is advanced to the time of the first event chronologically in the 
schedule. As a component fails the status of the system is checked and if the system 
fails the simulation ends. If the system doesn’t fail upon the failure of a component 
then a list of TLD criteria is checked to see if a TLD maintenance deadline or periodic 
inspection should be added to the schedule because of the component failure. The 
deadline or inspection could be added because of that failure alone, or because of that 
failure acting in combination with other component failures. The schedule and the 
correct ordering of events is perhaps the most important part of the simulation of 
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TLD. The structure utilised in the MCS code used here stores the positions of events 
previous to and after each event and these must be updated as, for example, the first 
event chronologically is removed from the schedule or deadlines are removed from 
the schedule after faults are repaired. 
 
One of the major advantages of implementing a MCS is the large degree of flexibility 
or complexity that may be involved in the code. For instance, when a maintenance 
deadline is reached, the different repair strategies that are possible may be easily 
carried out. It would be possible, for example, to clear all faults from the system at 
each deadline, to clear all faults falling into the same dispatch category or to simply 
address the fault that caused the deadline. Other strategies are possible and part of the 
beauty of MCS lies with the fact that different maintenance strategies could be tested 
before being applied to a real system. MCS is also able to model different strategies 
better than the usual TWA or Markov-based approaches. 
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Figure 6. The Algorithm for the Main Module of the MCS Code. 
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The algorithm for the main module of the MCS code used in this work is shown in 
Figure 6. Due to the fact that any maintenance operations (TLD deadlines and 
inspections) cannot occur mid-flight the time of such operations are adjusted to occur 
between flights. This is done by moving the operation forward to the beginning of the 
flight in which it would otherwise fall.  
 
The code written and used to model TLD here is flexible in that it can use data from 
any fault tree of a system failure mode. In addition to the fault tree, the failure 
distributions of the components and the TLD dispatch criteria to be applied to the 
system are passed to the code before simulations begin. The failure rate of the system 
is calculated after every 1000 simulations and the solution is obtained to the required 
number of significant figures. This is done by checking the value of the failure rate is 
unchanged for a number of consecutive calculations. 
 
Example System 
 
The system modelled in this work is a simple one, containing only 4 components. The 
system architecture is shown in Figure 7. As can be seen from the diagram, it 
essentially consists of two channels, 1 and 2, each of which contains a power supply 
and a CPU. However, in order to add further redundancy to the system, a link between 
the two channels is provided that allows, for example, the channel 1 power supply to 
provide power to the channel 2 CPU if its own power supply fails. The failure rates of 
the individual components are given in Table 1, along with the dispatch category that 
will be applied if one of them fails. These dispatch categories were determined for 
each component by considering the instantaneous failure rate (to LOTC) with that 
component failed, using the approximation given in equation (5). The same 
approximation was used to estimate the instantaneous failure rate (to LOTC) of each 
of the dual fault states, i.e. the system configurations where two faults are present in 
the system. These failure rates suggested that all dual faults would fall into the DND 
category and thus need not be included in the SAE TWA and Markov analyses. 
However, these dual faults are included in the MCS as DND faults. Higher order fault 
states than this needn’t be considered for this system since once three components are 
failed the system is definitely failed. 
 
Channel 1 
Power 
Channel 2 
Power 
CPU 1 
CPU 2 
Channel 2 
Channel 1 
 
Figure 7. The Simple FADEC System Representation. 
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When modelling the system using the TWA and reduced-state Markov approaches the 
failure rate due to mechanical/hydromechanical faults, λHMC, and the failure rate due 
to unrevealed faults, λUR, were not considered in the SAE analyses.  
 
Component Failure rate (failures per hour) Dispatch Category 
Power 1 9.0 × 10-5 STD 
CPU 1 5.2 × 10-5 LTD 
Power 2 8.0 × 10-5 STD 
CPU 2 6.5 × 10-5 LTD 
 
Table 1. Component Failure Rates and Dispatch Categories. 
 
TWA results were obtained for both methods of calculating the time fractions, see 
equations (4) and (6), given in the original [3] and revised [4] versions of SAE 
ARP5107. As was mentioned previously, the Markov results were obtained for a 
single fault state model, since higher order faults would fall into the DND category 
and needn’t be included in the analysis. This is also the case for the TWA model but 
these DND category faults are included in the MCS model. Results were obtained for 
the MCS for a number of different maintenance strategies and approaches. STD and 
LTD faults were addressed using all possible combinations of the MEL and PIR 
maintenance approaches. Thus both STD and LTD faults were dealt with using MEL 
maintenance in one set of simulations, one with MEL and the other with PIR in the 
next set and finally both would be maintained using PIR maintenance. When PIR 
maintenance was used to maintain faults the inspection interval was varied as a 
function of the dispatch interval and defined as 1.0, 1.5 and finally 2.0 times the 
dispatch interval. At the maintenance deadlines the faults could be repaired in a 
number of different ways in order to allow further dispatch after the deadline. For this 
system the repairs were carried out in three different ways, each of which represented 
carrying out a varying amount of work on the system. These were: 
1. Repair the last fault of the group of faults that initiated the maintenance 
deadline. 
2. Repair all of the group of faults that initiated the maintenance deadline. 
3. Clear all faults present in the system at maintenance deadlines. 
The first of these maintenance approaches represents perhaps the minimum amount of 
work that could be carried out at a maintenance deadline in order to allow further 
dispatch. An example of applying this approach would be as follows. If CPU1 failed a 
LTD interval would be initiated. If Power1 was to fail in the subsequent period before 
the maintenance deadline a DND maintenance deadline would be added to the end of 
the current flight. In this maintenance approach Power1 would be repaired, leaving 
the CPU fault present in the system until the LTD maintenance deadline occurs. The 
second approach would be a slightly more rigorous approach to repairs than the first 
because, for instance, in the example given above, as the DND maintenance deadline 
was encountered all faults that caused it, i.e. Power1 and CPU1, would be repaired. 
The final maintenance approach listed above is most likely to be the one that will 
produce the lowest LOTC rate, since when any maintenance deadline occurs all faults 
that are present in the system are repaired and the system is thus returned to a full-up 
state. For the MCS the maximum lifetime of the system was assumed to be 200000 
 270 
flt. hrs. This corresponds to a period of use of approximately 37 years for a system 
used for 15 hours per day. The length of a flight (used in the TWA approach and the 
MCS)) was set to be 5 hours. This was assumed in a worked example in [1]. 
 
Results 
 
Results were obtained for a STD interval length of between 50 and 200 flight hours 
(flt. hrs.) in 50 flt. hr. steps with the length of the LTD interval varying between 200 
and 2000 flt. hrs. in 200 hour increments. Below are some of the results obtained for 
the 200 flt. hr. STD interval. 
 
Figure 8 shows a comparison of the results from the SAE approaches and MCS with 
STD faults addressed using the MEL maintenance approach and LTD faults addressed 
using the PIR maintenance approach, which appears to be the most commonly-used 
maintenance combination in practice. The PIR inspection intervals are set at 1.5 times 
the dispatch intervals and at maintenance deadlines all faults are cleared from the 
system (the third of the approaches listed earlier). We can see from this graph that the 
TWA method with the original time fraction coefficients produces the highest 
calculated LOTC rate and that the TWA method with the revised time fraction 
coefficients produces a calculated LOTC rate that is consistently lower than this over 
the range of LTD intervals. The single state Markov is again lower but the lowest 
calculated LOTC rate comes from the MCS. Assuming that the MCS models the 
system more accurately than the other models, which is a reasonable assumption, this 
means that the TWA and single fault state Markov methods of analysis are suitable 
models for this system since the LOTC rate is overestimated. 
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Figure 8. A Comparison of the SAE ARP5107 Approaches With MCS. 
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Figure 9 shows a comparison of results for the three different maintenance approaches 
described earlier. Again, STD faults are addressed using MEL maintenance and LTD 
faults are addressed using PIR maintenance with the inspection interval set at 1.5 
times the dispatch interval. This graph shows that there is a significant difference in 
the predicted LOTC rate for the three maintenance approaches. While repairing the 
last fault of the group that caused the deadline the predicted LOTC rate is greater than 
the LOTC rate when repairing all faults that initiated the deadline or clearing all faults 
present in the system at the maintenance deadlines. The final two maintenance 
approaches give very similar results, the LOTC rate obtained when all faults are 
cleared from the system at maintenance deadlines being slightly lower. One would 
expect that this particular difference could be even more pronounced if a larger 
system were being modelled. With this in mind consider figure 10, which shows a 
comparison of the MCS results for the best and worst of the maintenance approaches 
with the results from the TWA method (with balanced time coefficients) and the 
single fault state Markov method. We can see here that the single fault state Markov 
approach actually gives a LOTC rate that is lower than that predicted when the system 
is repaired by repairing only the last fault of the group causing a maintenance 
deadline. The TWA method still overestimates the LOTC rate, even for this 
maintenance approach. As we saw earlier, both SAE methods overestimate the LOTC 
rate when all faults are cleared from the system at maintenance deadlines. In order to 
better quantify these differences consider figures 11 and 12, which show the 
percentage differences of the LOTC rate obtained using the TWA and single fault 
state Markov methods from the predicted LOTC rate from the MCS. Figure 11 clearly 
shows that when maintenance involves clearing all faults from the system the TWA 
method (with the original time coefficients) overestimates the LOTC rate in 
(STD-MEL, LTD-PIR) inspection interval = 1.5x dispatch interval.
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Figure 9. A Comparison of MCS Results for Different Maintenance Approaches. 
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comparison to the MCS by between 11.7% and 50.4% over the LTD interval range of 
200 to 2000 flt. hrs. Over the same range the TWA method with the balanced time 
coefficients overestimates the LOTC rate by between 5.7% and 18.8% and the single 
fault state Markov model overestimates the LOTC rate by between 1.75% and 9.68%. 
Figure 12 shows that the TWA method with original time coefficients overestimates 
the LOTC rate in comparison to the MCS by between 7.2% and 27.6% over the LTD 
interval range between 200 and 2000 flt. hrs. The TWA method with balanced time 
coefficients overestimates very slightly, the percentage overestimate actually falling 
from 1.5% to 0.8%. However, the single fault state Markov approach underestimates 
the LOTC rate in relation to the MCS by 2.3% at a value of 200 flt. hrs for the LTD 
interval. This percentage rises to 6.9% at a value of 2000 flt. hrs. for the LTD interval. 
 
The question now is what effect these differing modelling approaches would have on 
the dispatch of the system considered as an example here. Considering again figure 8 
it can be seen that, given the upper limit for the average LOTC rate of 10 failures per 
106 flt. hrs. that, given a STD interval of 200 hrs., the LTD interval could be set at 
about 1050 hrs. if the TWA method (with the original time coefficients) was used to 
model the system. Using the same method, but with the balanced coefficients, would 
allow the LTD interval to be set at about 1300 hrs., a vast improvement. However, the 
single fault state Markov model would allow the LTD interval to be set at about 1450 
hrs. and the MCS would allow a dispatch interval for LTD faults of around 1650 hrs if 
all faults were to be cleared from the system at the same time. However, from figure 9 
we can see that, if the maintenance approach involves repairing the last fault of the 
group that initiated the deadline, the maximum allowed LTD dispatch interval would 
be around 1400 hrs. 
(STD-MEL LTD-PIR) inspection interval = 1.5x dispatch interval.
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Figure 10. A Comparison of Differing Maintenance in MCS With 
SAE ARP5107 Approaches. 
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STD-MEL, LTD-MEL, clear all faults in the system at deadlines.
STD interval = 200 hrs.
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Figure 11. Percentage Difference of SAE Approaches From MCS. 
 
STD-PIR, LTD-PIR, repair last fault of the group that initiated the deadline.
STD interval = 200 hrs.
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Figure 12. Percentage Difference of SAE Approaches From MCS. 
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Only a small sample of the MCS results obtained are given because all the results 
showed similar trends to those presented above and the scenarios involved here were 
considered to be a good representation of a general approach to TLD. The shorter the 
STD interval, the smaller was the LOTC rate for particular LTD interval values, as 
would be expected. As would also be expected, increasing the length of the inspection 
interval when PIR maintenance was used led to an increase in the LOTC rate of the 
system. This increase in the LOTC rate was most pronounced when PIR was used to 
address LTD category faults, regardless of the maintenance approach used for STD 
faults. This may be due to the difference in length of the dispatch intervals themselves 
and therefore the relative lengths of the inspection intervals. For instance, for the 
maximum modelled LTD interval of 2000 hrs. the inspection interval (and hence 
potential exposure time of this failed system state to further faults) would be 4000 hrs. 
Contrast this with the situation for the maximum modelled STD interval of 200 hrs. 
where the inspection interval would only be 400 hrs. 
 
Conclusions 
 
A number of conclusions may be drawn from the modelling of the use of TLD on this 
simple system. The first, and perhaps most important, is that MCS allows the 
flexibility to model a large number of potential maintenance scenarios and observe the 
effect of these on the LOTC rate of the system. In short, a more exact modelling of 
the system lifetime is obtained. For this system the different maintenance approaches 
were demonstrated to have such an effect on the LOTC rate that the single fault state 
Markov approach, for one such maintenance approach was seen to underestimate the 
LOTC rate of the system in comparison to the MCS. It should be noted that the 
maintenance approach in question (repairing the last fault of the group of faults that 
caused the deadline) may not necessarily be a realistic approach and that it may be 
possible to modify the single fault state Markov approach in order to better model 
such a repair strategy. However, this may bring an element of doubt as to whether the 
SAE modelling approaches would always guarantee a LOTC rate of 10 or less failures 
per 106 hrs for any system. Of course, the application of TLD to a more complex, 
realistic system may result in more accurate results or at least a guaranteed 
overestimate of the LOTC rate of the system. This requires further investigation. 
 
The use of MCS could clearly prove to be a useful tool in the modelling of TLD. 
Indeed, if one looks from certification viewpoint, MCS could allow the demonstration 
of compliance of the LOTC rate, whilst being able to maximise/optimise the dispatch 
intervals in order to establish the most advantageous maintenance strategy. MCS 
could also offer most accurate measure for the LOTC rate of the system and be used 
to obtain other information about the system, such as the instantaneous LOTC rates 
from various system states. 
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